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Abstract. A dynamic epistemic logic is presented in which the single
agent can reason about his knowledge stages before and after announce-
ments. The logic is generated by reinterpreting multi agent private an-
nouncements in a single agent environment. It is shown that a knowa-
bility principle is valid for such logic: any initially true ϕ can be known
after a certain number of announcements.
In recent years a novel explication of knowability has been studied in the frame-
work of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) [4], in which ‘knowable’ is read as ‘can
be known after an announcement’ [1], [5]. Under this explication it has been
shown that the knowability principle (KP), the principle according to which all
truths are knowable, does not hold in public announcement logic (PAL) [1] nor in
its extension arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) [5]. Instead of using
public announcements, this contribution focuses on the investigation of knowa-
bility using the logical structure of private announcements [4]. For this purpose,
private announcements are reinterpreted in a single agent environment.
1 Agents in Private Announcements as Stages
of Knowledge
One can reinterpret the logical structure of private announcements to a set of
epistemic agents as an update of a single agent who can reason about past and
present stages of knowledge.
For instance, consider the situation in which two agents, 0 and 1, don’t know
p, and the private announcement of p which is given to agent 1. Let [E , e] denote
this action of private announcement. Then M, w |= [E , e]K1(p ∧ ¬K0p) is the
case, which says that after the private announcement, agent 1 knows p and she
also knows that agent 0 does not know p. This situation can be reinterpreted as
one containing a single agent with two sequential stages of knowledge, stage 0 as
the initial stage, and stage 1 as the stage after the first announcement. Then K0
and K1 represent the knowledge stages before and after the first announcement,
respectively. Under this interpretation, [E , e]K1(p∧¬K0p) is read ‘after the first
update, the agent knows (K1) that p and that before the update she didn’t know
(¬K0) p’. The above example is depicted in Fig. 1. For a proper exposition of
private announcements in DEL, see ([4], p. 173).
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w : p v : ¬p0,1
0,1 0,1
e : p t : 0
1 0,1
⇒
(w, e) : p
(w, t) : p (v, t) : ¬p
0 0
0, 1
1
0, 1 0, 1
Fig. 1. An example of a private announcement to agent 1 in action model logic (AML).
The upper left epistemic model M describes the initial ignorance of agents 0 and 1;
the lower left model E describes the private announcement of p to 1; the right model
M × E is the epistemic model after the announcement. 0 and 1 can be reinterpreted
as stages of knowledge of a single agent.
The aim below is to present such a dynamic epistemic logic of stages of knowl-
edge, as a modification of PAL.
2 Stages of Knowledge Logic SKL
The alphabet of stages of knowledge logic (SKL) is the same as of PAL. For
the inductive definition of the language of SKL LSKL, we have the following
restricted form of a PAL language
ϕ := | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kiϕ | [α]ψ s.t.
α := | p | ¬α | α1 ∧ α2 | Kiα | α1 ∧ [α1]α2
Let LEL and LPL denote the languages of epistemic logic without announce-
ments and of propositional logic, respectively. In SKL, theKi operator represents
the single agent’s knowledge after the i-th announcement. For that we define a
degree function d that assigns a natural number to each occurrence of [ϕ]ψ in
an SKL formula, s.t. d([ϕ]ψ) = i is read as ‘ϕ is the ith announcement’. When
clear by context, instead of writing d([ϕ]ψ), we write d(ϕ).
Definition 1. Let d : LSKL → IN, be a degree function, assigning every formula
and sub-formula in LSKL a natural number. Let dmax(α) assign for each α of the
language the highest d of its sub-formulae. To determine the d of α ∈ LSKL and
all of its sub-formulae, one applies the following tree rules, where at each node
d is applied according to the below specification. For the root of the tree let n = 0.
ϕ ∧ ψ n
ϕ n′ = n + m(ϕ ∧ ψ) ψ n′ = n + m(ϕ ∧ ψ)
ϕ n
ϕ n′ = n + m(ϕ)
[ψ]ϕ n
ψ n′ = n ϕ n′ = n + m([ψ]ϕ)
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(Where  = ¬,Ki)
d(α) = n+m(α). m(α) = 0 if α = [ϕ]ψ. Otherwise, m([ϕ]ψ) = 1 + dmax(ϕ)
Definition 2. Given an announcement [ϕ]ψ s.t. d(ϕ) = n define its ϕ-list to be
a list < α′1...ϕ > s.t. the i-th member (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of the list is the announcement
of degree i that has, or is within an announcement that has, ψ in its scope. Given
a ϕ-list, a ϕ-sequence is obtained by replacing any member αi in the ϕ-list of the
form β ∧ [β]γ to γ s.t. the ϕ sequence contains only formulae of epistemic logic.
The semantics of SKL can be seen as a modification of PAL semantics (for an
exposition of the latter, see [4]). Given a model M, after the announcement of
ϕ, instead of moving to the model M|ϕ in which all the ϕ states are eliminated
as we do in PAL, in SKL we move to a certain union of the existing model M
and its PAL update M|ϕ. This requires defining an initial SKL model, its PAL
update model, and the union of the two.
Definition 3. Given a single agent S5 epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) its SKL
initial model is a structure M0 = 〈W 0, {R0i | i ≤ n}, V 0〉, where:
W 0 = {(w, 0)|w ∈ W}.
R0i = R for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
(w, 0) ∈ V 0(p) iff w ∈ V (p).
Definition 4. Given a model Mi and an announcement ϕ s.t. d(ϕ) = i+1, the
PAL’ model of Mi, written Mi|ϕ is:
W i|ϕ = {(w, i+ 1) : w ∈ W and Mi, (w, i) |= ϕ}
(w, i + 1)Rij|ϕ(v, i+ 1) iff j ≥ d(ϕ) and (w, i)Rij(v, i)
(w, i + 1) ∈ V i|ϕ(p) iff w ∈ V (p).
We abbreviate (w, i) as wi.
Definition 5. Given an initial M0 model and an announcement ϕ s.t. d(ϕ) = n
and < α1...αn > is the sequence of ϕ, define the model Mn to be:
Wn = Wn−1 ∪Wn−1|αn
Rnj = R
n−1
j ∪Rn−1j|αn and if j < n, then wnRnj vj iff wjR
j
jvj
V n = V n−1 ∪ V n−1|αn
We read wxR
j
iuy as ‘in the model Mj , wx is related to uy with relation i’. In
the R clause of the definition we specify that a state wn can ‘look down’ at a
state uj (j < n) only with the relation j: wnR
n
j uj .
Definition 6. Given an SKL model Mi we define satisfaction as usual with the
following change
Mi, wj |= [ϕ]ψ iff, if Mi, wj |= ϕ, then Md(ϕ), wd(ϕ) |= ψ
Mi, wj |= 〈ϕ〉ψ iff Mi, wj |= ϕ, and Md(ϕ), wd(ϕ) |= ψ
For a simple example of the SKL semantics, consider an agent who initially
does not know p. After announcing p the agent knows p and that before the
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announcement he didn’t know p: M0, w0 |= [p]K1(p ∧ ¬K0p). This update is
depicted in Fig. 2. Note that d(p) = 1. As was implied earlier, SKL can be
reinterpreted as a multi agent logic with n agents s.t. the first announcement
is given to agents 1 to n and excludes agent 0, the second is given to agents 2
to n and excludes agents 0 and 1, and so on. Similarly to PAL, SKL contains
reduction axioms for announcements which allow the translation of each SKL
formula to an epistemic logic formula, and which make the system complete [3].
w0 : p v0 : ¬p0,10,1 0,1
[p] ⇒
w1 : p
w0 : p v0 : ¬p
0 0
0, 1
1
0, 1 0, 1
Fig. 2. The single agent who initially does not know p learns p. The left model is M0,
the initial model. The right model is M1, the model after the first announcement. Note
that in M1 relation R1 is reflexive. In general, Ri is always reflexive in Mi [3].
3 SKL and the Knowability Principle
In the philosophical literature the KP is regularly formulated as ϕ → ♦Kϕ.
The knowability paradox connected to this formulation is the modal derivation
showing that if the KP holds, then all truths are actually known: ϕ → Kϕ [2].
The KP in PAL is formulated as ϕ → 〈ψ〉Kϕ for some ψ, and it is invalid in the
latter logic and in its relevant extensions [1], [5]. In this section, we show that
for any ϕ, the formula ϕ → 〈ψ〉Knϕ is true for a ‘high enough’ n. To prove so,
we first define the notion of bisimilarity (relevant to SKL).
Definition 7. A non-empty relation Z ⊆ Wn × Wm is called a bisimulation
from 0 to k between Mn and Mm iff the following conditions are satisfied:
Atoms: If wiZwj then wi and vj satisfy the same propositional letters.
Forth: If wiZwj and wiR
n
l vh (s.t. l ≤ k), then there is a vx ∈ Wm s.t. vhZvx
and wjR
m
l vx.
Back: If wiZwj and wjR
m
l vh (s.t. l ≤ k), then there is a vx ∈ Wn s.t. vxZvh
and wiR
n
l vx. We write (Mn, wi)  (Mm, wj) for bisimilar states. If (Mn, wi) 
(Mm, wj) from 0 to k, then Mn, wi |= ϕ iff Mm, wj |= ϕ for any ϕ ∈ LEL with
epistemic modalities K0...Kk.
Lemma 1. (Mn, wn)  (Mn+1, wn+1) from 0 to n.
proof sketch: Define a relation Z ⊆ Wn × Wn+1 s.t. for any wi in Wn and
Wn+1 (i ≤ n) respectively, wiZwi, and for wn+1 ∈ Wn+1, let wnZwn+1. Then
Z is bisimulation for the modalities K0...Kn. For a full proof, see the extended
version of this contribution ([3], p. 61).
Given the bisimilarity result one can show that a KP is valid in SKL.
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Theorem 1. For an arbitrary initial SKL model (M0, w0),
M0, w0 |= ϕ → 〈ψ〉Knϕ
for some ψ and a Kn s.t. n ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof goes by the construction of a formula ψ and stage n for each
given ϕ of the language of SKL. If ϕ ∈ LPL then let ϕ = ψ and n = 1. Then
for such ϕ, M0, w0 |= ϕ → 〈ϕ〉K1ϕ can be easily checked to be true. Otherwise,
assume ϕ′ ∈ LSKL s.t. the highest knowledge modality Km in ϕ′ is m. Start
by translating ϕ′ using the SKL announcement axioms to a formula ϕ ∈ LEL.
Let ψ be identical to a sequence of m announcements of  followed by an an-
nouncement of ϕ, i.e. ψ = 〈〉...〈〉〈ϕ〉 s.t. d(ϕ) = m+1. Consider the following
KP for ϕ: M0, w0 |= ϕ → 〈〉...〈〉〈ϕ〉Km+1ϕ. Assume M0, w0 |= ϕ. Then
Mm wm |= ϕ as the announcements of  do not change the truth value of ϕ
[3]. Hence, in order to show that Mm, wm |= 〈ϕ〉Km+1ϕ it remains to show
that Mm+1, wm+1 |= Km+1ϕ. Pick an arbitrary ux s.t. wm+1Rm+1m+1ux. By Def-
inition 5 it must be that ux = um+1 and by the assumption of the existence of
um+1 it follows that Mm, um |= ϕ. By Lemma 1 (Mm, um)  (Mm+1, um+1)
from 0 to m, and since by assumption ϕ contains modalities up to m, it follows
that Mm+1, um+1 |= ϕ. Therefore, Mm+1, wm+1 |= Km+1ϕ and so Mm, wm |=
〈ϕ〉Km+1ϕ. Note that sequence of announcements 〈〉...〈〉〈ϕ〉 is equivalent to
one nested announcement 〈ψ′〉 in SKL as in PAL.
Unlike other epistemic logics that can express a KP, SKL avoids the knowa-
bility paradox: all truths are knowable but not all truths are known. I note that
while the standard exposition of the paradox assumes the necessitation rule for
the possibility operator ♦ to derive the paradox [2], the necessitation rule for
announcements is unsound in SKL [3].
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